Band 4, Heft 3

Core inflation plays an important role in the deliberations of monetary policy-makers. In this paper we evaluate a number of measures of core inflation constructed using euro-area data. In addition to the traditional exclusion-type core measures, we examine two newer ones, documenting their properties and evaluating their performance in terms of their ability to track underlying or trend inflation in real time. We focus on core measures derived from the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) as the European Central Bank has chosen to define its mandate for price stability in terms of this index, and because this is the only index of consumer prices that is compiled in a comparable manner across all members of the European Union. We document significant excess kurtosis in the cross-section distribution of price changes in the euro area, and show that several categories of prices are more volatile than those typically excluded from traditional measures of core inflation. Contrary to what one might expect, traditional measures of core inflation are not significantly less volatile than headline measures.We document the superior performance of alternative measures of core inflation in tracking trend inflation on average, but show that none of the various measures of core gave significant advance warning of the pickup in trend inflation at the beginning of 1999.

A structural vector error correction (SVEC) model is used to investigate several monetary policy issues. While being data-oriented the SVEC framework allows structural modeling of the short-run and long-run properties of the data. The statistical model is estimated with monthly German data for 1975-98 where a structural break is detected in 1984. After splitting the sample, three stable long-run relations are found in each subsample which can be interpreted in terms of a moneydemand equation, a policy rule and a relation for real output, respectively. Since the cointegration restrictions imply a particular shape of the long-run covariance matrix this information can be used to distinguish between permanent and transitory innovations in the estimated system. Additional restrictions are introduced to identify a monetary policy shock.

This paper examines the role of financial market imperfections for output reactions to nominal interest rate shocks. Empirical evidence shows a humpshaped impulse response function of output and suggests that credit supply co-moves with output. A monetary business cycle model with staggered price setting is presented where the firms’ outlays for capital and labor must be covered by the sum of net worth of entrepreneurs and loans in the form of debt contracts. These properties are shown to generate a hump-shaped impulse response of output, which takes on the smooth and persistent appearance of the empirical output response when nominal wages are set in a staggered way, too.

The paper investigates how monetary policy shocks influence the composition of firms’ external finance given that firms are heterogeneous. Heterogeneity stems from differences in the availability of internal funds and in the monitoring costs associated with bank finance. These costs are determined by the intensity of the lending relationship. By using a delegated monitoring approach it is found that bank loans serve as a substitute for internal funds if the lending relationship is sufficiently close. Moreover, banks with strong credit ties to their customers are not only able to protect borrowers from liquidity constraints following a monetary tightening but are even able to extend their business lending.

According to McCulloch, Longfield and Loyd, a free banking system is always prone to overissues of bank notes. Their view is supported by the free banking era in Switzerland (1826-1907), where, due to competitive pressures within the banking community and the absence of note-brand loyalty on the part of the general public, overissues (causing a rise in the foreign exchange rates above the upper gold and silver points) finally became permanent. Free competition, therefore, had to give way to collusive action and, in 1907 (with the open consent of the issuing banks), to the establishment of the Swiss National Bank.