Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter i
2. CONTENTS vii
3. Acknowledgments ix
4. Introduction: The Limits of Rationality 1
5. PART ONE The Theory of Rational Choice
6. 1 When Rationality Fails 19
7. Comment: What Might Rationality Fail to Do? 51
8. 2 Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions 60
9. 3 Choice Under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved 90
10. Comment: Should a Rational Agent Maximize Expected Utility? 132
11. 4 Rational Choice in Experimental Markets 146
12. Comment: Individual Decision Making versus Market-Level Predictions: The Applicability of Rational Choice Theory 175
13. PART TWO Preference Formation and the Role of Norms
14. 5 De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum 191
15. Comment: De Gustibus Non Est Explanandum 217
16. 6 Cooperation and Rationality: Notes on the Collective Action Problem and Its Solutions 222
17. Comment: On the Inadequacy of Game Theory for the Solution of Real-World Collective Action Problems 240
18. 7 Norm-Generating Structures 250
19. Comment: An Alternative Approach to the Generation and Maintenance of Norms 273
20. PARTTHREE Institutions
21. 8 Reason and Rationality 285
22. Comment: Stinchcombe's "Reason and Rationality" 317
23. 9 Managerial Dilemmas: Political Leadership in Hierarchies 324
24. Comment: Applying Rational Choice Theory: The Role of Leadership in Team Production 349
25. 10 The Social Evolution of Cooperation 358
26. Comment: On Russell Hardin's "The Social Evolution of Cooperation" 378
27. 11 Institutions and Their Consequences for Economic Performance 383
28. 12 A Logic of Institutional Change 402
29. List of Contributors 419
30. Index 421