Wittgenstein, Wissen und die Gnade der Natur
Abstract
This paper is an attempt to explain Wittgenstein’s remark that „It is always by favor of Nature that one knows something.“ In this regard, two positions are distinguished. The first one is the standard interpretation within analytic epistemology. Alternatively, I will suggest another possibility to interpret Wittgenstein’s remark, which is inspired by John McDowell’s epistemological disjunctivism. As I am going to show, the alternative is the better choice.
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© 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Frontmatter
- Articles
- ‘Reddish Green’ – Wittgenstein on Concepts and the Limits of the Empirical
- Wittgenstein’s Thought-Experiments
- Stroud on Logical Necessity and General Facts of Nature
- Wittgenstein as a Common-Sense Realist
- Philosophy from an ‘Anthropological’ Point of View
- Objectivity and Idealism
- Wittgenstein, Wissen und die Gnade der Natur
- Interpretation und das Prinzip der Nachsicht
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Frontmatter
- Articles
- ‘Reddish Green’ – Wittgenstein on Concepts and the Limits of the Empirical
- Wittgenstein’s Thought-Experiments
- Stroud on Logical Necessity and General Facts of Nature
- Wittgenstein as a Common-Sense Realist
- Philosophy from an ‘Anthropological’ Point of View
- Objectivity and Idealism
- Wittgenstein, Wissen und die Gnade der Natur
- Interpretation und das Prinzip der Nachsicht
