Band 20, Heft 3 - Special Issue: Advances in Peace Economics and Peace Science

The indirect effects of military spending on security are stronger and more important than its direct effects, and its long run impact more telling than its short run impact. In the short run, military spending can be a source of both physical security and economic stimulus. In the long run, it can be counterproductive in terms of physical security and will be a dead weight on the economy. How a society’s productive resources are deployed, as between military spending and more economically productive activities, sets it on a long-term course with powerful implications for the ability of its economy to do what it is supposed to do – provide for the material well-being of the population as a whole. The mechanism by which the extensive and extended diversion of productive economic resources to economically unproductive military spending drags an economy down is analyzed. Furthermore, it is possible to use properly structured international and domestic economic relationships in place of threats or use of military force to increase national and international security, while at the same time enhancing, rather than degrading, economic wellbeing. Three principles for structuring such a “peacekeeping economy” are set forth.

The defence-growth nexus has been investigated by many studies and has always been a controversial area of research. By applying an Augmented Solow Growth Model integrated with a military burden variable, this paper examines the effect of military expenditure on economic growth for 21 OECD countries during the period 1960–2009. Different panel estimation methodologies are used to analyze the economic effects of military expenditure. The empirical results suggest that military expenditure would appear to have a negative effect on growth.

Both corruption and market imperfections are important facets of modern arms markets. In the standard literature of arms market, production, procurement, sales (exports) and purchases (imports) of arms take place in the shadow of corruption. Corruption is an integral part of the environment of the arms trade that exerts an influence upon the outcome in the arms market. In our work, we make corruption as a choice variable of the powerful players in the global arms market and examine the equilibrium consequence of corruption that is strategically chosen by armament firms. We develop a simple duopoly to characterize a perfect Nash equilibrium of cash-for-favors and establish perplexing comparative static properties of this equilibrium. The primary intuition here is that cash-for-favors can have serious impacts on the equilibrium of an oligopoly through their effects on the incentives of and constraints on individual firms. We offer a model of endogenous corruption, to our understanding for the first time, to examine the global arms market in order to establish that the equilibrium outcome in the arms market cannot be fully captured by the standard results of oligopoly. Researchers have to extremely careful in applying the standard tools of oligopoly to the arms market as our results suggest that endogenous corruption can reverse most of the known results of oligopoly.

The major dependent variable in peace science research has appropriately been death from inter-group conflict with war the major focus. However, a tenable hypothesis is that the same or similar motivations result in other risks to life. For example, the number of human deaths each year from preventable nonmilitary sources is approximately 20,000,000. Most major sources that assess the loss of life from military and related conflicts identify, over a long period of time, not more than 2,000,000/year. This dependent variable may also be extended to the non-military category. For example, evidence has emerged that approximately twenty-percent of the active duty female members of the US military are sexually assaulted by other members of the military during their period of service (Dick 2012). Thus, it seems reasonable to address a variety of phenomena that may be represented by a common set of attributes. These variables should include degree of physical injury, size of acting units, and public vs. private agents. Preventable non-military death is similar to the classification for death from war except that the agents are frequently private, such as corporations. This analysis is intended to contribute to a continuing discussion of the boundaries of the peace science domain. One function of the discussion is to foster the examination of a range of behaviors that may derive from a set of basic motives and goals. The discussion section concludes with reference to the problem of understanding a central factor in inter-group conflict – identification with the group.

In this paper we extend dyadic research on conflict processes in international relations, to the analysis of triadic relationship. Specifically, we argue that although conflict can be explained at the dyadic level of analysis, a triadic analysis can greatly enrich our understanding of the dynamics of conflict and cooperation. We present a theory of triadic relationship and test it with data on the effect of aid and trade of Middle Eastern dyads with major powers (the US, The Soviet Union/Russia, the UK and France) in the post-WWII era using negative binomial regression. The results show the importance of expanding research in International Relations from dyadic to triadic interactions. Robustness tests demonstrate the validity of our analysis.

For researchers and students of International Relations (IR), one date looms larger than all others: 1648. The end of the Thirty Years War, formalized by the signing of the Treaties of Osnabrück and Münster, led to a period known as the “Peace of Westphalia.” Westphalia represented a fundamental change in the power balance of European politics: instead of the Holy Roman Empire holding supreme authority, power would now rest with states themselves, manifested in terms of sovereignty, territory and equality. One of the chief ways in which these “Westphalian” states would cement this authority was through the use of maps. Before 1648, there was little on a European map to indicate where one country ended and another one began. But after 1648, this all changes: these new Westphalian states are represented with bright colors and clearly marked boundaries, defining borders and becoming an important part in creating the state and justifying its sovereignty. The role which maps have played in the spread of the Westphalian state is only just beginning to be researched. Yet the limited efforts to date have all focussed on Europe. This is unfortunate, as today, while Europe has, according to some observers, moved into a stage in which Westphalia is no longer a useful model with which to understand the state and the ways in which it relates to sovereignty, government, power and the individual, the old Westphalian model of the state has more recently been exported all around the world. This paper presents the first part of a project which aims to look at this expansion. The European angle will be presented in this paper; future research will be carried out in China, Japan and Taiwan.

This paper is all about the construction of a new analytical framework to understand conflict and cooperation both at the international and at the domestic level with the aim of then finding mechanisms to reduce tensions and initiate conflict resolution schemes. The existing research literature on such analytical frameworks has so far been conducted a) mostly on standard social science disciplinary lines and has not incorporated the important work done on these questions by neuro-scientists and behavioral geneticists and b) is not really capable except in very specific instances to deal with the evolving dynamics of conflict and cooperation. Conflict over scarce resources (territory, mates, food) between members of the same species is a universal feature of evolution. Often conflict, especially armed conflict is supposed to be due to shows of force by two or more parties in order to appropriate or dominate resources. Force appears thus not to be the only decisive factor; perceived entitlement and powerful feelings of injustice thereby generated in the case of challenge, extended to group identity are also at the basis of conflict and aggression in humans. The relationship between environment and conflict, the role of emotions such as fear, and the absence of clear definition and enforcement of property rights within societies are also factors in the development of conflict. Thus we have here developed an analytically based numerical model that aims to include finding on these topics by Neuroscience and to emphasize the role of emotions in conflict and cooperation dynamics. This model has been simulated without specific reference to a particular country with the result that economic conditions drive our system since in one case sustained growth produces stability and end of combats whereas deteriorating capital growth and GDP collapse lead to increased hostile coalition participation and more fighting. However, the mere trigger of economic conditions is insufficient to explain conflict escalation, which results from increased participation in mutually hostile coalitions and greater fighting propensity where emotions such as fear and resentment play their role. Finally a detailed empirical analysis of the current Syrian conflict has been undertaken which shows the ability of the model to forecast actual historical developments. This study also indicates that worsening economic conditions are not the only triggering factors in civil conflict. Perceptions of opportunities due to a weakening of a regime’s authority also play a major role.