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Dall’Uno al Nulla. Appunti per una nuova lettura di Arist. Ph. I 2.185b19–25

  • Giulio M. Cavalli EMAIL logo
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 25. Juni 2025
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Abstract

In Ph. I 2.185b19–25, Aristotle puzzlingly challenges essence monism, arguing that, if all things have the same definition and essence, they are nothing at all. In his recent book on Aristotle and the Eleatics, Tim Clarke proposes a traditional reading: if essence monism were true, all opposite predicates would belong to all subjects at the same time, thus making all things self-contradictory and hence annihilating them. In this paper I contend that this standard reading, dating back to Cherniss and Ross, is mistaken. After a preliminary contextualisation of the passage at issue, I present Clarke’s reading and initially strengthen it by referring to a seemingly parallel passage from Metaph. I then discuss the difficulties surrounding the standard reading of these two texts, showing that both need to be interpreted differently. Building on this criticism, I finally set out the requirements that an alternative reading should meet, outlining some of its main features as well.


Corresponding author: Giulio M. Cavalli, Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici, Naples, Italy, E-mail:

Ringraziamenti

Versioni precedenti e parziali di questo saggio sono state presentate alle edizioni 2021 e 2023 di “Eleatica”; ringrazio quindi gli organizzatori e i partecipanti di quelle giornate per aver accolto con interesse le mie idee. Desidero inoltre ringraziare due revisori anonimi per i generosi suggerimenti, e infine Alessio Santoro e Luca Torrente per aver discusso con me la prima stesura del saggio.

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Published Online: 2025-06-25
Published in Print: 2025-06-26

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Heruntergeladen am 14.11.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/elen-2025-0004/html
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